We propose a generalization of expected utility that we call generalized EU (GEU), where a decision maker's beliefs are represented by plausibility measures and the decision maker's tastes are represented by general (i.e., not necessarily real-valued) utility functions. We show that every agent, "rational" or not, can be modeled as a GEU maximizer. We then show that we can customize GEU by selectively imposing just the constraints we want. In particular, we show how each of Savage's postulates corresponds to constraints on GEU.
Introduction
Many decision rules have been proposed in the literature. Perhaps the best-known approach is based on maximizing expected utility (EU), calculated either with respect to a given (objective) probability measure, as done originally by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947] , or with respect to a probability measure constructed from a preference order on alternatives that satisfies certain postulates, as done originally by Savage [1954] . All these approaches follow the same pattern: they formalize the set of alternatives among which the decision maker (DM) must choose (typically as acts or lotteries 1 ). They then give a set of assumptions (often called postulates or axioms) such that the DM's preferences on the alternatives satisfy these assumptions iff the preferences have an EU representation, where an EU representation of a preference relation is basically a utility function (and a probability measure when acts are involved) such that the relation among the alternatives based on expected utility agrees with the preference relation. Moreover, they show that the representation is essentially unique in that, given two representations of the same preference relation, the utility functions are positive affine transformations of one another and the probability measures are equal. Thus, if the preferences of a DM satisfy the assumptions, then she is behaving as if she has quantified her tastes via a real-valued utility function (and her beliefs via a probability measure) and she is relating the alternatives according to their expected utility. The assumptions are typically regarded as criteria for rational behavior, so these results also suggest that if a DM's beliefs are actually described by a probability measure and her tastes are described by a utility function, then she should relate the alternatives according to their expected utility (if she wishes to appear rational).
Despite the appeal of EU maximization, it is well known that people do not follow its tenets in general [Resnik 1987] . As a result, a host of extensions of EU have been proposed that accommodate some of the more systematic violations (see, for example, [Gul 1991; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; Giang and Shenoy 2001; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Luce 2000; Quiggin 1993; Schmeidler 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Yaari 1987] ). Again, the typical approach in the decision theory literature has been to prove representation theorems. These representation theorems essentially view a decision rule R as a function that maps tastes (and perhaps beliefs, depending on the rule) to a preference relation on alternatives. The theorem then says that, given a rule R, there is a set A R of assumptions about preference orders such that a preference relation satisfies A R iff there exists some tastes and beliefs for the agent such that, given these as inputs, R returns .
Given this plethora of rules, it would be useful to have a general framework in which to study decision making. The framework should also let us understand the relationship between various decision rules. We provide such a framework in this paper.
The basic idea of our approach is to generalize the notion of expected utility so that it applies in as general a context as possible. To this end, we introduce expectation domains, which are structures consisting of
• three (component) domains: a plausibility domain P , a utility domain U , and a valuation domain V ,
• two binary operators ⊕ : V × V → V and ⊗ : P × U → V , which are the analogues of + and × over the reals, and
• a reflexive binary relation on V (which generalizes ≤).
Intuitively, ⊗ combines plausibility values and utility values much the same way that × combines probability and (real) utility, while ⊕ combines the products to form the (generalized) expected utility, in a way analogous to adding products of probabilities and utilities in calculating standard expected utility.
We have three domains because we do not want to require that DMs be able to add or multiply plausibility values or utility values, since these could be qualitative (e.g., plausibility values could be "unlikely", "likely", "very likely", etc., and utility values could be "bad", "good", "better", etc.). In general, we do not assume that is an order (or even a preorder), since we would like to be able to represent as many preference relations and decision rules as possible.
Once we have an expectation domain, DMs can express their tastes and beliefs using components of the expectation domain. More specifically, the DMs express their beliefs using a plausibility measure [Friedman and Halpern 1995] , whose range is the plausibility domain of the expectation domain (plausibility measures generalize probability measures and a host of other representations of uncertainty, such as sets of probability measures, Choquet capacities, possibility measures, ranking functions, etc.) and they express their tastes using a utility function whose range is the utility domain of the expectation domain. In an expectation domain, it is possible to define a generalization of expected utility, which we call generalized EU (GEU). The GEU of an act is basically the sum (in the sense of ⊕) of products (in the sense of ⊗) of plausibility values and utility values that generalizes the standard definition of (probabilistic) expected utility over the reals in the obvious way.
In [Chu and Halpern 2003] we show that many decision rules have GEU representations. Moreover, we show that (almost) every decision rule has an ordinal GEU representation, where, rather than x and τ (x) representing exactly the same tastes (and beliefs), they preserve the relation between tastes (and beliefs), without necessarily preserving the magnitude. For example, if outcome o 1 is preferred to outcome o 2 in x, o 1 is also preferred to o 2 in τ (x), although the magnitude of preference may be different.
Our claim that only "many" decision rules have a GEU representation may seem inconsistent with our earlier claim that every preference relation has a GEU representation. Representing a preference relation is not the same as representing a decision rule. If we again view a decision rule as a function from tastes (and possibly beliefs) to preference relation on alternatives, then decision rule R represents a preference relation if there are some tastes and beliefs such that, with these as input, R returns . On the other hand, R 1 represents R 2 if, roughly speaking, for all possible inputs of tastes (and beliefs), R 1 and R 2 return the same preference relation. That is, R 1 and R 2 act essentially the same way as functions.
Although there has been a great deal of work on decision rules, there has been relatively little work on finding general frameworks for representing decision rules. In particular, there has been no attempt to find a decision rule that can represent all preference relations. There has been work in the fuzzy logic community on finding general notions of integration (which essentially amounts to finding notions of expectation) using generalized notions of ⊕ and ⊗; see, for example, [Benvenuti and Mesiar 2000] . However, the expectation domain used in this work is (a subset of) the reals; arbitrary expectation domains are not considered. Luce [1990 Luce [ , 2000 also considers general addition-like operations applied to utilities, but his goal is to model joint receipts. Receipts are typically modeled in an arguably inefficient way, as commodity bundles; it seems more natural to deal with them as Luce does, in terms of an abstract binary operation, akin to the operations we have here.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We cover some basic definitions in Section 2: plausibility domains, utility domains, expectation domains, decision problems, and GEU. We show that every preference relation on acts has a GEU representation in Section 3. In Section 4, we show that each of Savage's postulates corresponds to an axiom on GEU. We conclude in Section 5. Most proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Preliminaries

Plausibility, Utility, and Expectation Domains
Since one of the goals of this paper is to provide a general framework for all of decision theory, we want to represent the tastes and beliefs of the DMs in as general a framework as possible. In particular, we do not want to force the DMs to linearly preorder all consequences and all events (i.e., subsets of the set of states). To this end, we use plausibility measures to represent the beliefs of the DMs and (generalized) utility functions to represent their tastes.
A plausibility domain is a set P , partially ordered by P (so P is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation), with two special elements ⊥ P and ⊤ P , such that (We often omit the subscript P in ⊥ P and ⊤ P when it is clear from context.) ⊥ P P x P ⊤ P for all x ∈ P . Given a set S, a function Pl : 2 S → P is a plausibility measure iff Pl1. Pl(∅) = ⊥, Pl2. Pl(S) = ⊤, and
Clearly plausibility measures are generalizations of probability measures. As pointed out in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] , plausibility measures generalize a host of other representations of uncertainty as well. Note that while the probability of any two sets must be comparable (since R is totally ordered), the plausibility of two sets may be incomparable.
We also want to represent the tastes of DMs using something more general than R, so we allow the range of utility functions to be utility domains, where a utility domain is a set U endowed with a reflexive binary relation U . Intuitively, elements of U represent the strength of likes and dislikes of the DM while elements of P represent the strength of her beliefs. Note that we do not require the DM's preference to be transitive (although we can certainly add this requirement). Experimental evidence shows that DM's preferences occasionally do seem to violate transitivity.
Once we have plausibility and utility, we want to combine them to form expected utility. To do this, we introduce expectation domains, which have utility domains, plausibility domains, and operators ⊕ (the analogue of +) and ⊗ (the analogue of ×). 3 More formally, an expectation domain is a tuple E = (U, P, V, ⊕, ⊗), where (U, U ) is a utility domain, (P, P ) is a plausibility domain, (V, V ) is a valuation domain (where V is a reflexive binary relation), ⊗ : P × U → V , and ⊕ : V × V → V . There are four requirements on expectation domains:
E1 and E2 say that ⊕ is associative and commutative. E3 says that ⊤ is the left-identity of ⊗ and E4 ensures that the expectation domain respects the relation on utility values.
Note that we do not require that ⊕ be monotonic; that is, we do not require that for all
We say that E is monotonic iff (2.1) holds. It turns out that monotonicity does not really make a difference by itself; see Corollary 3.2.
Recall that in the standard case, ⊥ = 0 and 0 × x is the identity for +. In general, we do not assume that ⊥ ⊗ u is the identity ⊕ (or that ⊕ even has an identity). We say that E has a ⊕ identity iff
Because ⊕ is commutative, there can clearly be at most one identity for ⊕, so if (2.2) holds, then ⊥ ⊗ u 1 = ⊥ ⊗ u 2 for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . Requiring (2.2) has very little effect on our results. Some of the proofs become easier, while others become somewhat more difficult, but the theorems still hold. Note that we also do not require ⊗ to distribute over ⊕. The obvious way to state such a requirement is to require that p ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = (p ⊗ x) ⊕ (p ⊗ y). But this is not well-defined. The domain of ⊗ is P × U and the domain of ⊕ is V × V . If x, y ∈ U , then x ⊕ y, p ⊗ x, and p ⊗ y are all well defined, but x ⊕ y may be an element of V − U , so p ⊗ (x ⊕ y) may not be well defined. As we shall see, in cases where it the distributive property makes sense (for example, if V = U or if u 1 ⊕ u 2 ∈ U for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ U ), then it actually does hold in many examples of interest.
Example 2.1 The standard expectation domain, which we denote E, is (R, [0, 1] , R, +, ×), where the ordering on each domain is the standard order on the reals. This, of course, is the expectation domain which is used in defining most decision rules in the literature. It is clearly monotonic and has a + identity, namely 0.
• we use the standard order on the utility domain R;
• the order on the plausibility domain [0, 1] 
and p 2 ≤ q 2 ;
• similarly, (
• ⊕ is defined pointwise:
• ⊗ is pointwise multiplication:
We can view the utility domain R as a substructure of the valuation domain R × R by identifying the element u ∈ R with the pair (u, u) . Note that the ordering on the plausibility domain and the ordering on the utility domain are both partial. E 2 is also monotonic, and has (0, 0) as the ⊕ identity. The distributive property (which makes sense here) is also easily seen to hold:
It turns out to also be of interest to consider the expectation domain E ′ 2 which is defined just like E 2 except that the order ′ V on the valuation domain is defined by taking (
Decision Situations and Decision Problems
A decision situation (under uncertainty) describes the objective part of the circumstance that the DM faces (i.e., the part that is independent of the tastes and beliefs of the DM). We model a decision situation in a standard way, as a tuple A = (A, S, C), where
• S is the set of states of the world,
• C is the set of consequences, and
• A is a set of acts (i.e., a set of functions from S to C).
An act a is simple iff its range is finite. That is, a is simple if it has only finitely many consequences. Many works in the literature focus on simple acts (e.g., [Fishburn 1987] ). We assume in this paper that A contains only simple acts; this means that we can define (generalized) expectation using finite sums, so we do not have to introduce infinite series or integration for arbitrary expectation domains. Note that all acts are guaranteed to be simple if either S or C is finite, although we do not assume that here. A decision problem is essentially a decision situation together with information about the tastes and beliefs of the DM; that is, a decision problem is a decision situation together with the subjective part of the circumstance that faces the DM. Formally, a (plausibilistic) decision problem is a tuple D = (A, E, u, Pl), where
• u : C → U is a utility function, and
• Pl : 2 S → P is a plausibility measure.
We say that D is monotonic iff E is monotonic.
(Generalized) Expected Utility
Let D = ((A, S, C), E, u, Pl) be a plausibilistic decision problem. Each a ∈ A induces a utility random variable u a : S → U as follows: u a (s) = u(a(s)). In the standard setting (where utilities are real-valued and Pl is a probability measure Pr), we can identify the expected utility of act a with the expected value of u a with respect to Pr, computed in the standard way (where we use ran(f ) to denote the range of a function f ):
We can generalize (2.3) to an arbitrary expectation domain E = (U, P, V, ⊕, ⊗) by replacing +, ×, and Pr by ⊕, ⊗, and Pl, respectively. This gives us
We call (2.4) the generalized EU (GEU) of act a. Clearly (2.3) is a special case of (2.4).
In the probabilistic case, if all singleton sets are measurable with respect to Pr (i.e., in the domain of Pr), then
The plausibilistic analogue of (2.5) is not necessarily equivalent to (2.4). A decision problem ((A, S, C), E, u, Pl) is additive iff, for all c ∈ C and nonempty X, Y ⊆ S such that X ∩ Y = ∅,
Note that the notion of additivity we defined is a joint property of several components of a decision problem (i.e., ⊕, ⊗, u, and Pl) instead of being a property of Pl alone. Additivity is exactly the requirement needed to make the analogue of (2.5) equivalent to (2.4). While decision problems involving probability are additive, those involving representations of uncertainty such as DempsterShafer belief functions or, more generally, Choquet capacities, are not, in general.
Example 2.3 For a decision problem (A, E, u, Pr), where E is the standard expectation domain and u is a real-valued utility function, GEU agrees with EU.
Example 2.4 Consider the decision problem(A, E 2 , u, (Pr 1 , Pr 2 )), where E 2 is the expectation domain described in Example 2.2 and u is a real-valued utility function. The pair (Pr 1 , Pr 2 ) of probability measures can be viewed as a single plausibility measure. If A = (A, S, C), then the plausibility of X ⊆ S is a pair (Pr 1 (X), Pr 2 (X)). It is easy to check that
4 If the domain of Pr is some nontrivial subalgebra of 2 S , then we must assume that ua is a measurable function; that is, u −1 a (x) is a measurable set for all x ∈ ran(ua).
Moreover, E (Pr
On the other hand, if we consider E ′ 2 , we still have
We can think of the plausibility measure (Pr 1 , Pr 2 ) as describing a situation where the DM is unsure which of Pr 1 and Pr 2 is the "right" probability measure. In E 2 , act a is considered at least as good as a ′ if it is at least as good no matter which of Pr 1 and Pr 2 describes the actual situation. In E ′ 2 , a is at least as good as a ′ if the worst expected outcome of a (with respect to each of Pr 1 and Pr 2 ) is at least as good as the worst expected outcome of a ′ . Note how relatively different orderings of valuation domain can produce quite different ordering on acts, using GEU.
Another example of the use of GEU can be found in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Although the construction does not correspond to any standard decision problem in the literature, it does show how flexible the approach is.
Representing Arbitrary Preference Relations
In this section, we show that every preference relation on acts has a GEU representation. GEU, like all decision rules, is formally a function from decision problems to preference relations on acts. Thus a GEU representation of a preference relation A on the acts in
Theorem 3.1 Every preference relation A has a GEU representation.
Proof: Fix some A = (A, S, C) and A . We want to construct a decision problem
The idea is to let each consequence be its own utility and each set be its own plausibility, and define ⊗ and ⊕ such that each act is its own expected utility. For each c ∈ C, let a c denote the constant act with the property that a c (s) = c for all s ∈ S. Let E = (U, P, V, ⊕, ⊗) be defined as follows:
(Note that Savage assumes
that A contains all simple acts; in particular, A contains all constant acts. We do not assume that here.)
, where x V y iff x = y or x, y ∈ A and x A y. (Note that set-theoretically a function is a set of ordered pairs, so A ⊆ 2 S×C .)
5. X ⊗ c = X × {c} for X ∈ 2 S (= P ) and c ∈ C (= U ).
We can identify c ∈ C with S × {c} in V ; with this identification, (U, U ) is a substructure of (V, V ) and ⊤ ⊗ c = c for all c ∈ U (= C), as required. Furthermore, ⊕ is clearly associative and commutative, so E is indeed an expectation domain. Let D = (A, E, u, Pl), where u(c) = c and Pl(X) = X. Note that
That is, each act is its own expected utility; by the definition of V , it is clear that
Note that, unlike most representation theorems, there is no uniqueness condition in Theorem 3.1. This is because, unlike most representation theorems, we do not assume that the expectation domain is E, the standard expectation domain, and we do not assume that A satisfies any assumptions. So one reason for the lack of uniqueness in Theorem 3.1 is because we place no restriction whatsoever on A . The other reason for the lack of uniqueness is that we consider arbitrary expectation domains instead of restricting ourselves to E. Note that, even if A satisfies all of Savage's postulates, although there is a unique GEU representation of A using the standard expectation domain E and probability measures (this is essentially Savage's result), there is no unique GEU representation if we allow arbitrary expectation domains. In particular, the representation constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is certainly distinct from the one Savage [1954] constructs.
While there is no unique GEU representation, the GEU representation we construct in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is canonical in the following sense. Fix a decision situation A = (A, S, C) and a preference relation A . Suppose D = (A, E, u, Pl) is the decision problem constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 and let D 0 = (A, E 0 , u 0 , Pl 0 ) be an arbitrary GEU representation of A , where
It is easy to check that
Thus, the representation we construct is minimal, in the sense that we relate only what has to be related to satisfy the definition of representation. Moreover, the representation constructed in Theorem 3.1 is in fact additive, since if
and has a ⊕ identity, namely ∅.
The expectation domain E constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is not (necessarily) monotonic, since we certainly could have two acts a and b such that
In fact, our construction has the property that two distinct expressions are unrelated unless they are both expected utility values. As the following corollary shows, it is not hard to modify the proof by extending V so as to make E monotonic.
Corollary 3.2 Every preference relation has a monotonic additive GEU representation with a ⊕ identity.
Proof: See the appendix.
Corollary 3.2 shows that requirements like monotonicity, additivity, and having a ⊕ identity do not restrict the kind of preference relation that GEU can represent. But this means that these requirements do not by themselves prevent GEU from producing "strange" preference relations when it is applied as a decision rule. In the next section, we consider constraints on expectations domains that do force the preference relation produced by GEU to be arguably more reasonable.
Theorem 3.1 holds in large part because of the flexibility we have. Given a decision situation (A, S, C) and a preference relation A on A, we are able to construct an expectation domain and a relation V that is customized to capture the relation A on A. We do not need quite this much flexibility. We can strengthen Theorem 3.1 to show that for every decision situation A = (A, S, C), there exists an expectation domain E A such that for all preference relations A on A, there exists a utility function u and plausibility measure Pl such that GEU((A, E, u, Pl) = A . That is, given A, we can fix the expectation domain once and for all, rather than taking a different expectation structure (more precisely, a different order V on the valuation domain) for each preference relation A . Indeed, we can even fix the plausibility measure once and for all as well. Proof: Again, the argument proceeds by modifying the construction in Theorem 3.1. We leave details to the appendix.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 depend (in part) on two features of our setup. The first is that, following Savage [1954] , we took acts to be functions from states to consequences. This is not an entirely trivial assumption. In practice, different acts might produce the same consequences, depending on how the consequences are modeled. For example, suppose that Alice has a red umbrella and a blue umbrella (both in good condition). If the set of consequences is {"getting wet", "staying dry"}, then carrying the red umbrella will produce the same consequences as carrying the blue umbrella. Suppose instead that we have a consequence function c : A × S → C that takes an act a and a state s and gives the consequence of a in s. Of course, in this setting, two distinct acts a 1 and a 2 could induce the same function from states to consequences; that is, we might have c(a 1 , s) = c(a 2 , s) for all s ∈ S. It is easy to see that if a 1 and a 2 induce the same function from states to consequences, then no matter what expectation domain, utility function, and plausibility measure we use, a 1 and a 2 will have the same expected utility. Thus, if A does not treat a 1 and a 2 the same way, then A has no GEU representation. (An analogue of Theorem 3.1 holds in this case: as long as two acts that induce the same function are treated the same way by A , then A has a GEU representation.)
A second reason that we do not need consistency constraints on A is that we have placed no constraints on V , and relatively few constraints on ⊕, ⊗, u, and Pl. If, for example, we required V to be transitive, then we would also have to require that A be transitive. The lack of constraints on ⊕, ⊗, u, and Pl is important because it gives us enough freedom to ensure that distinct acts have different expected utility. In the next section, we investigate what happens when we add more constraints.
Representing Savage's Postulates
Theorem 3.1 shows that GEU can represent any preference relation. We are typically interested in representing preference relations that satisfy certain constraints, or postulates. The goal of this section is to examine the effect of such constraints on the components that make up GEU. For definiteness, we focus on Savage's postulates.
A set P e of axioms about (i.e., constraints on) plausibilistic decision problems represents a set of postulates P r about decision situation and preference relation pairs with respect to a collection of decision problems Π iff for all D ∈ Π, D = (A, E, u, Pl) satisfies P e iff (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P r .
Theorem 3.1 can be viewed as saying that the empty set of axioms represents the empty set of postulates with respect to the collection of all plausibilistic decision problems. Note that if P e represents P r with respect to Π 0 and Π 1 ⊆ Π 0 , then P e represents P r with respect to D 1 as well.
Before we present Savage's postulates, we first introduce some notation that will make the exposition more succinct. Suppose that f : X → Y , g : X → Y , and Z ⊆ X. Let f, Z, g denote the function h such that h(x) = f (x) for all x ∈ Z and h(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ Z. For example, if X = Y = R and Z = {x | x < 0}, then −x, Z, x is the absolute value function. In the intended application, the functions in question will be acts (i.e., functions from the set of states S to consequences C). So a = a 1 , X, a 2 is the act such that a(s) = a 1 (s) for all s ∈ X and a(s) = a 2 (s) for all s ∈ X. For brevity, we identify the consequence c ∈ C with the constant act a c such that a c (s) = c for all s ∈ S. So for c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, c 1 , X, c 2 is the act with the property that a(s) = c 1 for all s ∈ X and a(s) = c 2 for all s ∈ X. Recall that X 1 , . . . , X n is a partition of Y iff the X i 's are nonempty and pairwise disjoint, and
Fix some decision situation (A, S, C). Readers familiar with [Savage 1954 ] will recall that Savage assumes that A consists of all possible functions from S to C, since the DM can be questioned about any pair of functions. (Though when Savage proves the main theorem in Chapter 5 of [Savage 1954 ], he restricts attention to acts that induce simple lotteries, since he essentially reduces his problem to the one already solved by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947] , and von Neumann and Morgenstern focused on simple lotteries.) This is a rather strong assumption. It means that the DM is required to have preferences on a rather large set of acts, many of which are not in his power to perform (and, indeed, many of which might be impossible to realize). Savage needs this assumption for his theorem. We do not need it for our results, although making this assumption simplifies the statement of the relevant axioms. As we have throughout this paper, in this section, we continue to allow A to be any nonempty subset of the set of all simple acts. The reader might wonder why we do not simply allow A to be the set of all simple acts, since we do not require A to be total. The point is that having A consist of all simple acts conceptually requires that the DM explicitly decide, for each pair of acts, whether they are related, and if so, how; if A is a subset of the set of all acts, then the DM does not have to express a preference between acts not in A.
It turns out that the statement of a number of our results is simpler if A consists of all simple acts. To facilitate the comparison of our results with the standard results from the literature, where it is typically assumed that A consists of all simple acts, we use brackets (i.e., " [ " and " ] ") to delimit parts of the postulates that pertain to the general case in which A is an arbitrary nonempty subset of the set of all simple acts. So there are two versions of the postulates, one for the general case, which we refer to as the general version, and one for the special case (i.e., the case in which A is the set of all simple acts), which we refer to as the special version. The general version includes the bracketed statements while the special version does not. Typically, the statements inside the brackets turn unconditional assertions of the special version into implications whose antecedent says that the acts in question are in fact members of A. We recommend that the reader ignore the material inside the brackets on a first pass. Savage's first six postulates are given in Figure 1 . It is easy to check that all the bracketed statements are trivially true if A is the set of all simple acts.
As is standard in the literature, we use "a 1 ≺ A a 2 " to abbreviate "a 1 A a 2 and a 2 A a 2 ", and we use "a 1 ∼ A a 2 " to abbreviate "a 1 A a 2 and a 2 A a 1 ". (Note that in general ≺ A and ∼ A P1. For all a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A, (a) a 1 A a 2 or a 2 A a 1 , and (b) if a 1 A a 2 and a 2 A a 3 , then a 1 A a 3 .
P2. For all
P3. For all X ⊆ S, if there exist a 1 , a 2 ∈ A such that [ there exists b 0 ∈ A such that a i , X, b 0 ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, and ]
, and ]
P5. There exist c 1 , c 2 ∈ C such that [ c 1 , c 2 ∈ A and ] c 1 ≺ A c 2 .
P6. For all a, b ∈ A, c ∈ C, if a ≺ A b, then there exists a partition Z 1 , . . . , Z n of S, such that for are not necessarily transitive, since A is not necessarily transitive.) Recall that X 1 , . . . , X n is a partition of Y iff i X i = Y and for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n such that i = j, X i = ∅ and X i ∩ X j = ∅. We now give a brief overview of the intuition behind the postulates and how Savage uses them. P1 is the standard necessary condition for representation by EU (and many of its generalizations), since R is a linear order; it basically says that A is a total preorder. Savage defines for each subset X ⊆ S a conditional preference relation on acts as follows: a 1 X A a 2 iff [ there exists a ∈ A such that a i , X, a ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2} and ] for all a ∈ A, [ if a i , X, a ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2}, then ] a 1 , X, a A a 2 , X, a (As in the statements of the postulates, we use brackets to delimit parts that are needed for the general version.) Intuitively, a 1 X A a 2 if when X occurs the DM would find a 2 at least as good as a 1 . Note that A = S A , so P1 guarantees that S A is a total preorder. However, X A is not necessarily a total preorder for all X, even if P1 holds-for this, we need P2.
P2 says that the way two acts are related depends only on where they differ; the part on which they agree can be ignored. Note that it follows from P2 that either
Thus, in the presence of P2, a 1
Using X A , Savage defines what it means for a set to be null: a set X is null iff for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ A,
. It is easy to check that if X A is a total preorder then the general version and the special version are equivalent. Note that X is not null iff there exist a 1 , a 2 ∈ A such that a 1 ≺ X A a 2 . In other words, if X is not null, then the DM has some nontrivial preference if X occurs. P3 basically says that if X is not null, then c 1 A c 2 iff c 1 X A c 2 . That is, whenever the DM has some nontrivial preference, the preferences over consequences remain the same as the unconditional ones. Savage defines a relation S on events as follows:
The intuition is that, given two consequences c and d such that d ≺ A c, the DM prefers a binary act that is more likely to yield c than d, according to her beliefs. This is very much in the spirit of arguments of de Finetti [1931] . P4, in the presence of P1-P3 and the assumption that A is the set of all simple acts, basically ensures that S is a total preorder. P5 says that S is not null. That is, the DM has some nontrivial (unconditional) preference. P1-P5 by themselves do not allow the construction of a unique EU representation (even if we assume that A is the set of all simple acts). However, with the assumption that A is the set of all simple acts, P1-P5 ensure that S is a qualitative probability. In order to obtain a unique EU representation we need P6, which says roughly that for all pairs of acts a, b ∈ A and consequences c ∈ C, if a ≺ A b then we can partition S into events such that the DM does not care if c were to happen in any element of the partition. Savage also has a seventh postulate, but it is relevant only for general (nonsimple) acts. Since we consider only simple acts, we omit it here.
It may seem that we should consider stronger versions of some postulates in the general case. For example, we might consider a version of P2 that says that if a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , and b 2 are simple acts (not necessarily in A) such that a i , X,
A a 2 , X, b 2 . Fortunately, it is not hard to show that the stronger version is equivalent to the version that we have stated here, where a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , and b 2 are required to be in A, since if a, X, b ∈ A, then in fact there exist some a ′ , b ′ ∈ A such that a ′ , X, b ′ = a, X, b : just take a ′ = b ′ = a, X, b . Thus it suffices in all the postulates to quantify over A instead of over all simple acts.
Given a decision problem D = ((A, S, C), E, u, Pl) and ∅ = Z ⊆ S, define the GEU of act a restricted to Z as follows:
Note that E Pl,E (u a ↾ S) = E Pl,E (u a ). Suppose that D = ((A, S, C), E, u, Pl) is additive. It is then easy to check that, for all nonempty proper subsets X of S,
and, more generally, given a partition X 1 , . . . , X n of Y ⊆ S, we have that
Also, it is easy to check that for all nonempty proper subsets X of S,
Note that while these statements are true for additive decision problems, they are not true in general.
Let E D (X) = {E Pl,E (u a ↾ X) | a ∈ A}. (We omit the subscript D if it is clear from context.) Intuitively, E D (X) consists of all the expected utility values of acts in A restricted to X. To simplify the statement of one of the axioms, let
where u, v ∈ U and X ⊆ S. Note that E Pl,E (u c,X,d ) = u(c), X, u(d) . The cases X = ∅ and X = S must be treated specially, since we do not assume that ⊥ ⊗ u is the identity for ⊕. As with Savage's postulates, we use brackets to delimit parts needed for the general version. See Figure 2 for a list of the axioms.
A1 says that the expected utility values are linearly preordered; more specifically, A1a says that they are totally preordered and A1b says that the relation is transitive. Note that A1 does not say that the whole valuation domain is linearly preordered: that would be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for GEU(D) to satisfy P1. Since we want necessary and sufficient conditions for our representation results, some axioms apply only to expected utility values rather than to arbitrary elements of the valuation domain.
[ There is a technical assumption that we need for some parts of the general version of our result. In general, it might be the case that E Pl,E (u a ) ∈ E(S), but a / ∈ A; this could happen if, even though a / ∈ A, there is some b ∈ A such that E Pl,E (u a ) = E Pl,E (u b ). (Note that u a is well defined whether or not a ∈ A, so it makes sense to talk about E Pl,E (u a ) even if a / ∈ A.) We say that D is whole iff this does not happen; more precisely, D = ((A, S, C), E, u, Pl) is whole iff for all simple acts a ∈ C S , E Pl,E (u a ) ∈ E(S) implies a ∈ A. A decision problem whose set of acts is the set of all simple acts is whole, but that is not a necessary condition for a decision problem to be whole. In general, a decision problem D = ((A, S, C), E, u, Pl), where E = (U, P, V, ⊕, ⊗) is whole iff, for all x ∈ V , either every act with expected utility x is in A, or no act with expected utility x is in A. ]
To simplify the statement of the theorem, let Π all be the collection of all plausibilistic decision problems and let Π add be the collection of additive decision problems. Also, let Π 0 be the collection of decision problems whose set of acts is the set of all simple acts [ along with all decision problems that are whole ] . Let
Proof: See the appendix. 
A2. For all nonempty proper subsets
A3. For all nonempty proper subsets X of S, if there exist x 1 , x 2 ∈ E(X) such that [ there exists y 0 ∈ E(X) such that x i ⊕ y 0 ∈ E(S) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and ]
A6. For all x, y ∈ E(S), u ∈ ran(u), if x ≺ V y, then for all a, b ∈ A, c ∈ C, such that E Pl,E (u a ) = x, E Pl,E (u b ) = y, and u(c) = u, there exists a partition Z 1 , . . . , Z n of S, such that x can be expressed as x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n and y can be expressed as y 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ y n , where to allow it to be a partial preorder (a situation explored by Lehmann [1996] ), we simply need to drop the axiom A1b. Although we have focused here on Savage's postulates, it is straightforward to represent many of the other standard postulates considered in the decision theory literature in much the same way.
Conclusion
We have introduced GEU, a notion of generalized EU, and shown that GEU can (a) represent all preference relations on acts and (b) be customized to capture any subset of Savage's postulates.
As we pointed out in the introduction, these results may be of particular interest to designers of software agents, who may want to deal with more general representations of tastes and beliefs than real-valued utilities and probabilities. If beliefs are represented using a plausibility measures and tastes are represented by a utility function that is not necessarily real-valued, the problem for the software designer is reduced to finding appropriate ways of combining plausibility and utility using ⊕ and ⊗, and finding an appropriate order on the resulting expressions. The results of this paper suggest that rationality postulates can be captured by choosing ⊕ and ⊗ so that they satisfy certain constraints. The results of [Chu and Halpern 2003] show that we lose no generality by using GEU to represent the decision making process; essentially all decision rules rules can be (ordinally) represented by GEU. Thus, the framework of expectation domains together with GEU provides a useful level of abstraction in which to study the general problem of decision making and rules for decision making and a useful conceptual framework for designing decision rules for software agents.
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A Proofs
Corollary 3.2 Every preference relation has a monotonic additive GEU representation with a ⊕ identity.
Proof: Fix some A = (A, S, C) and A . Let D be as defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1, except that x V y iff x = y or there exist a, b ∈ A such that a A b and
Recall that E Pl,E (u a ) = a, so without case 2, we are back in the situation described in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that, by construction, the only way that E Pl,E (u a ) ⊕ z can be an expected utility value is if z ⊆ E Pl,E (u a ), since ⊕ = ∪ and proper supersets of expected utility values cannot be expected utility values. Thus, if in case 2 both x and y are expected utility values, then we must in fact be in case 1; case 2 has an effect only when x and y are not both expected utility values. Thus, case 2 does not affect how pairs of expected utility values are related, so we still have that GEU(D) = A . To see that ⊕ is monotonic with respect to this definition of V , suppose that x V y. We need to show that x ⊕ z V y ⊕ z. If x = y, then x ⊕ z = y ⊕ z, so the conclusion holds. Suppose that x = y. Then there exist some a, b ∈ A such that a A b and either case 1 or case 2 holds. It is easy to see that in either case, x ⊕ z V y ⊕ z by case 2. Thus D is a monotonic representation of A (and, as we have already observed, D is additive). Proof: Let P(A) consist of all preference relations on A. We now modify the construction in Theorem 3.1 as follows:
2. P = (2 S , ⊆).
and either x = y or x, y ∈ A and x A y.
The same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, this construction gives an additive expectation domain. We can modify V as in Corollary 3.2 to make it monotonic. With a little more effort, we can further modify it so that there is a ⊕ identity; we omit details here. Let Pl(X) = X. Given a preference relation A , define the utility function u A by taking u A (c) = (c, { A }). Again, the same arguments as those in Theorem 3.1 can be used to show that
Proof: We first establish the result for singleton sets. Let D = (A, E, u, Pl), where A = (A, S, C), be an arbitrary decision problem. [ As in the statements of the postulates and axioms, we will use brackets to delimit the parts of the proof that pertain to the conditional versions. ]
• A1a represents P1a and with respect to Π 1a and A1b represents P1b with respect to Π 1b .
We do the case of A1a represents P1a with respect to Π 1a and leave the other case, which is completely analogous to the one we do, to the reader.
Suppose that D satisfies A1a. We need to show that (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P1a. Let a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A. Let x i = E Pl,E (u a i ); clearly x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ E(S). Since D satisfies A1a, x 1 V x 2 or x 2 V x 1 . In other words, a 1 GEU(D) a 2 or a 2 GEU(D) a 1 . Thus (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P1a. Now suppose that (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P1a. We need to show that D satisfies A1a. Let x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ E(S). Then there exist a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A such that E Pl,E (u a i ) = x i . Since (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P1a, a 1 GEU(D) a 2 or a 2 GEU(D) a 1 . Thus x 1 V x 2 or x 2 V x 1 . So D satisfies A1a.
• A2 represents P2 with respect to Π 2 . Throughout this part of the proof, we assume that D ∈ Π 2 ; in particular, we assume that D is additive and we will use this fact without further comment.
Suppose that D satisfies A2. We need to show that (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P2. Suppose that
If X = ∅ or X = S, then the above is trivially true. So assume that X is a nonempty proper subset of S. Let x i = E Pl,E (u a i ↾ X) and y j = E Pl,E (u b j ↾ X). Clearly x i ∈ E(X), y j ∈ E(X),
satisfies A2, we have that
Suppose that (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P2. We need to show that D satisfies A2. [ We assume for this direction that D is whole. ] Suppose that X is a nonempty proper subset of S, x 1 , x 2 ∈ E(X), and y 1 , y 2 ∈ E(X). [ Suppose further that x i ⊕ y j ∈ E(S). ] We need to show that
Note that there exist
[ Since x i ⊕ y j ∈ E(S) and D is whole, it follows that
Thus D satisfies A2.
• A3 represents P3 with respect to Π 3 .
Throughout this part of the proof, we assume that D ∈ Π 3 ; in particular, we assume that D is additive and we will use this fact without further comment.
For this part, we will prove a slightly stronger claim that actually has a shorter proof. Note that A3 and P3 are both implications. We show that D satisfies the antecedent (consequent) of A3 iff (A, GEU(D)) satisfies the antecedent (consequent) of P3.
[ We assume that D is whole in these arguments. ] This implies that D satisfies A3 iff (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P3.
Note that P3 quantifies over all subsets of S while A3 quantifies over only nonempty proper subsets of S. It is easy to check that ∅ and S satisfy P3. (More precisely, (A, GEU(D)) satisfies the instance of P3 in which X is instantiated with ∅ and the instance of P3 in which X is instantiated with S.) So for the rest of this part, we restrict our attention to nonempty proper subsets of S.
We begin by showing that D satisfies the antecedent of A3 iff (A, GEU(D)) satisfies the antecedent of P3. Fix some X that is a nonempty proper subset of S. We need to show that there exist x 1 , x 2 ∈ E(X) such that 1.
[ there exists y 0 ∈ E(X) such that x i ⊕ y 0 ∈ E(S) and ] for all y ∈ E(X),
To see that 1 implies 2, suppose that x 1 , x 2 ∈ E(X) satisfy 1. Since x 1 , x 2 ∈ E(X), there exist
We show that a 1 and a 2 satisfy 2.
[ To see that the first conjunct is true, note that by 1 there exists y 0 ∈ E(X) such that x i ⊕ y 0 ∈ E(S); fix some such y 0 . Note that there exists
For the second conjunct, we proceed as follows. ] Let b ∈ A [ be such that a i , X, b ∈ A ] . We need to show that
To see that 2 implies 1, suppose that a 1 , a 2 ∈ A satisfy 2. Let x i = E Pl,E (u a i ↾ X); note that
. We show that x 1 and x 2 satisfy 1.
[ To see that the first conjunct is true, note that by 2 there exists b 0 ∈ A such that a i , X, b 0 ∈ A; fix some such b 0 . Let
Note that x i ⊕y 0 = E Pl,E (u a i ,X,b ), so y 0 ∈ E(X) and x i ⊕y 0 ∈ E(S). For the second conjunct, we proceed as follows. ] Let y ∈ E(X) [ be such that x i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) ] . We need to show that
We now show that D satisfies the consequent of A3 iff (A, GEU(D)) satisfies the consequent of P3. We need to show that 3. for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ ran(u), [ if u 1 , u 2 ∈ E(S), then ] u 1 V u 2 iff [ there exists y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) and ] for all y ∈ E(X), [ if Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S), then ]
Pl(X) ⊗ u 1 ⊕ y V Pl(X) ⊗ u 2 ⊕ y Suppose that 3 holds. We need to show that 4 holds. Fix some c 1 , c 2 ∈ C [ such that c 1 , c 2 ∈ A ] . Let u i = u(c i ). Then u i ∈ ran(u) [ and u 1 , u 2 ∈ E(S) ] . Note that c 1 GEU(D) c 2 iff u 1 V u 2 . By 3, u 1 V u 2 iff [ there exists y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) and ] for all y ∈ E(X), [ if Pl(X)⊗u i ⊕y ∈ E(S), then ] Pl(X)⊗u 1 ⊕y V Pl(X)⊗u 2 ⊕y. [ It is easy to check that there exists y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) iff there exists b ∈ A such that c i , X, b ∈ A; the "only if" part depends on the assumption that D is whole. ] To see that 4 holds, fix some b ∈ A [ such that c i , X, b ∈ A ] . We need to show that c 1 , X, b GEU(D) c 2 , X, b . Let y = E Pl,E (u b ↾ X); then y ∈ E(X) and Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y = E Pl,E (u c i ,X,b ).
[ Since c i , X, b ∈ A, Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) ] . By 3, Pl(X) ⊗ u 1 ⊕ y V Pl(X) ⊗ u 2 ⊕ y; thus [ As before, it is easy to check that there exists b ∈ A such that c i , X, b ∈ A iff there exists y ∈ E(X) such that Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S); now the "if" part depends on the assumption that D is whole. ] To see that 3 holds, fix some y ∈ E(X) [ such that Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) ] . We need to show that Pl(X) ⊗ u 1 ⊕ y V Pl(X) ⊗ u 2 ⊕ y. Note that there exists some b ∈ A such that E Pl,E (u b ↾ X) = y; observe that E Pl,E (u c i ,X,b ) = Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y [ and c i , X, b ∈ A, since Pl(X) ⊗ u i ⊕ y ∈ E(S) and D is whole ] . By 4, c 1 , X, b GEU(D) c 2 , X, b ; thus Pl(X) ⊗ u 1 ⊕ y V Pl(X) ⊗ u 2 ⊕ y.
• A4 represents P4 with respect to Π 4 .
Suppose that D satisfies A4. We need to show that (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P4. So D satisfies A4.
• A5 represents P5 with respect to Π 5 .
D satisfies A5 iff there exist u 1 , u 2 ∈ ran(u) such that [ u 1 , u 2 ∈ E(S) and ] u 1 ≺ V u 2 iff there exist some c 1 , c 2 ∈ C such that [ c 1 , c 2 ∈ A and ] u(c 1 ) ≺ V u(c 2 ) iff there exist some c 1 , c 2 ∈ C such that [ c 1 , c 2 ∈ A and ] c 1 ≺ GEU(D) c 2 iff (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P5.
• A6 represents P6 with respect to Π 6 .
Throughout this part of the proof, we assume that D ∈ Π 6 ; in particular, we assume that D is additive and we will use this fact without further comment.
Suppose that D satisfies A6. We need to show that (A, GEU(D)) satisfies P6. Let a, b ∈ A and c ∈ C. Suppose that a ≺ GEU(D) b. We need to show that there exists a partition Z 1 , . . . , Z n of S, such that for all Z i ,
